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Democracy in Product Design: Consumer Participation
and Differentiation Strategies
Abstract
An increasing number of firms use social media to allow their customers to vote on new product
designs. This paper studies the implications of employing such a democratic product design (DPD).
A linear city model is used with random locations to capture uncertainty about consumer preferences
and to study strategic forces in monopoly and duopoly settings. The results indicate that a monopolist
will use market research to resolve the demand uncertainty, unless DPD provides a cost advantage.
In a duopoly, an asymmetric equilibrium emerges with exactly one firm using DPD. Commitment to
following consumer votes proves to be a strategic advantage, therefore at least one firm promises not
to deviate from the product design consumers voted for. A subtle way to influence the outcome of the
vote for firms is to generate product candidates instead of soliciting ideas from consumers. Employing
such a tactic allows firms to differentiate and they will be more likely to use DPD. Finally, the paper
studies the level of consumer engagement in DPD and shows that a monopolist always benefits from
a higher positive engagement and is hurt by negative engagement, although to a lesser extent. The
results are reversed for a duopolist as negative sentiments can serve as an additional differentiator.
Keywords: co-creation; consumer voting; new products; strategic differentiation
1 Introduction
There is an increasing number of firms inviting consumers to be closely involved in new product
decisions. These firms allow consumers to vote about products in a democtratic fashion and then
implement and produce the winning candidate. For example, Mountain Dew released its brand new
“White Out” product designed through the “Dewmocracy 2” campaign which involved consumers in
decisions on the flavor, color, and the name of the product. In the final round, consumers voted for
one of three versions of the soft drink to be produced and sold in stores. The smooth citrus flavored
White Out received 44% of the votes, surpassing the strawberry-pineapple flavored Typhoon (40%)
and the lime flavored Distortion (16%).1 In a related product category, Coca-Cola’s Vitamin Water
preceded Mountain Dew (although not in the carbonated soft drinks category) with its “flavorcreator”
Facebook application that let consumers design and vote for the next flavor of the drink.2 Other
examples include M&M’s soliciting over ten million votes for the new color of candy to be included
in their bags (Fuchs et al. 2010) or the DoUsAFlavor site by Lay’s Chips letting consumers vote on
different new flavors. Similarly, the Cheesecake Factory announced it’s new Stefanie’s Ultimate Red
Velvet Cheesecake at the conclusion of the “What’s You Flavor?” vote (Kim et al. 2014), while in
Europe, Danone led the way by accepting more than six million consumer votes online for the next
flavor of its Danette brand in 2006.
Customer involvement in new product development is not a radically new phenomenon, especially
in the B2B context, but since the advent of social media there has been a recent surge in consumer-
controlled product introductions. Even without a formal voting process or “election” in place, many
brands encourage their customers to participate in shaping the brand’s image and to contribute with
new products ideas. Often, a brand’s Facebook fan page is an important venue where consumers
can make comments or participate in polls3 that relate to the future of the brand. Although there
are various potential advantages of such deep consumer involvment (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000,
Fuchs et al. 2010), it is interesting to see that a company gives almost exclusive control to its customers
even in the highly competitive soft drink industry, where brand positioning and product differentiation
have always been important (Yoffie and Kim 2010).
A crucial component of social media that has an important effect on these situations is transparency.
1“What Mountain Dew Learned from DEWmocracy”, Adweek (2010) June, www.adweek.com.
2”Crowdsourcing 101: Why Vitaminwater’s Facebook App Can’t Lose”, www.fastcompany.com.
3“Facebook fine-tunes its Questions product”’, (2011) March news.cnet.com
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In most cases consumers can follow the vote or poll results on the web or on social media which makes
it hard for firms not to implement the vote outcome. By deviating from what consumers voted for,
firms risk upsetting their current or future customers. While in earlier cases of consumer participation
only a small number of consumers may have been involved and the process could have been conducted
in relative isolation, social media potentially enables every single consumer to follow the process.
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of consumer participation in product design on
firm strategies, in particular with respect to competition and differentiation. Although the number of
marketers employing such tactics has been on the rise, there are many that shy away from involving
consumers so deeply. Therefore, it is important to understand the key tradeoffs driving a firm’s
choice to involve consumers in product related decisions. We focus our attention on what we call
democratic product design (DPD). In a DPD process, participating consumers collectively decide on
a new product’s features, often through a vote. The firm organizing the vote then implements the
decision or otherwise it faces potentially disappointed consumers with a lower willingness to pay for
its product.
Having consumers vote about a new product clearly benefits the firm by revealing consumer pref-
erences. The key question is whether giving so much control to consumers interferes with the firm’s
fundamental strategic goals, such as differentiating its products. While a monopolist may not worry
about differentiation, competing firms could be significantly affected by such high level of consumer
control. An important question is whether following the majority tastes potentially hurts those firms
that would like to differentiate or does it provide strategic advantages? At the same time, how is
consumer welfare affected?
Consumer involvement in the product design often involves an implicit promise that the firm will
honor the votes. However, given the strategic decisions at stake, is it credible that firms will follow
consumer votes? Or do firms have an incentive to deviate from the design that consumers voted for?
Finally, involving consumers may have additional marketing benefits through consumer engagement
with the product or the brand. We explore how consumer engagement enticed by the participation
affects firm strategies and whether increased consumer engagement is always beneficial for firms.
We develop an analytical model to address these questions, building on the standard horizontal
differentiation framework, but introducing consumer voting and uncertainty in consumers’ locations.
As in a typical linear city, consumers are located in the [0, 1] interval, but we assume that firms do
not know whether they lean more towards the left or the right side of this interval. We then allow
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firms to make a choice between choosing their location based on their priors, using traditional market
research, or engaging in a democratic product design process which allows consumers to vote on the
final product.
We find that unless DPD carries a cost advantage or provides direct benefits to participating
consumers, a monopolist will always want to use traditional market research to learn about consumer
preferences without having to commit to following consumer votes. Interestingly, the results are starkly
different in a duopoly. In equilibrium, one firm will use a democratic design process, whereas the other
firm will use traditional market research. The reason for the asymmetric equilibrium is that although
both market research and involving consumers presents an opportunity to learn consumer preferences,
commitment plays a crucial role in democratic product design. When only one firm commits to follow
average consumer preferences, its competitor is forced out of the center of the market, leaving the first
firm in a dominant position while allowing for differentiation and relatively soft price competition. On
the other hand, when both firms commit to follow consumer votes that are likely to be in the center of
the market, they will find themselves in fierce price competition. In other words, using a democratic
design process acts as a deterrent to enter the middle of the market yielding superior profits for the
firm that engages in it, but preventing its competitor from also doing so. Allowing for mixed strategies,
we find a corresponding unique symmetric equilibrium where each firm uses consumer voting with a
certain probability close to 1/2.
Although the asymmetric equilibrium is beneficial for the firm using DPD by ensuring high profits,
it is important to compare the profitability of the industry and consumer surplus between different
scenarios. The total industry profits (and thus the profit a firm can expect if it is randomly assigned
a role in the asymmetric equilibrium) are strictly lower than if both firms used traditional market
research or neither of them used market research. The expected profits are further reduced in the
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium as there is a chance of very intense price competition if both
firms use DPD. Therefore, firm profits are clearly hurt by the possibility of using DPD due to the
strategic effects of commitment. In contrast, consumer surplus increases as a result of DPD as con-
sumers are better off both in the asymmetric equilibrium and the symmetric mixed equilibrium. This
is not only a result of products in the market that fit the average consumer’s taste better, but also a
result of increased price competition.
To further examine the role of commitment, we analyze firms’ incentives to follow consumer votes
and to manipulate the results. We extend the model by allowing firms to deviate from the vote
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outcome at the expense of being penalized by consumers. When the penalty is high we replicate our
main results, but at lower levels of consumer sensitivity, a different equilibrium emerges in which both
firms use DPD and deviate from the results to reach a moderate level of differentiation. This results in
lower profits for both firms than if firms used only market research. We also investigate whether firms
would want to impose a penalty upfront by making promises to consumers about following the vote
results. We find that if firms have a way to self-impose a high enough penalty at least one of them
will do so. This suggests that at least one firm has an incentive to implement a transparent process,
thereby committing to not manipulating the results of the vote. Interestingly, when the maximum level
of transparency limits the level of commitment firms can make, they will both use DPD anticipating
not to deviate from the vote results, but this leads to tough price competition and reduced prices.
Finally, we examine the role of consumer engagement. Often, an increased benefit of involving
consumers in product design is that they spend time on the firm’s website or social media page,
possibly improving their attitude and willingness to pay for a product. We find that this is always
beneficial for a monopolist, but may be detrimental in a duopoly as it makes consumer voting too
attractive to firms, hindering their ability to effectively differentiate. Furthermore, we analyze the
potential backlash from consumers who are upset if they voted for a product design that did not
win. Surprisingly, such a negative reaction typically does not hurt duopolists as it acts as an extra
differentiator.
2 Relevant Literature
The idea of involving consumers in production emerged in the literature in the B2B context (von
Hippel 1976) and was further developed with a focus on the role of lead users in developing new
product ideas (von Hippel 1986). In a more general sense, the concept of co-creation, introduced
by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000), acknowledges the economic value of involving customers from
conception to delivery of the product. The subsequent literature consists of papers developing the
framework of co-creation (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004, Payne et al. 2008), and open innovation
(Chesbrough 2003), considering its psychological implications (Bendapudi and Leone 2003, Fuchs et al.
2010, Kim et al. 2014), examining the role of the Internet (Mohanbir Sawhney 2005), the effect on
consumer loyalty (Auh et al. 2007), and the process of eliciting ideas from consumers (Morgan and
Wang 2010). Our paper has a substantially different focus from the existing literature in that we
concentrate on the competitive effects of consumer involvement in product design. In particular, we
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study a B2C context with wide consumer participation and examine consumers’ role only in product
design and not in production or delivery with a special focus on competition.
We use a standard horizontal differentiation model with location choice (Hotelling 1929, D’Aspremont
et al. 1979). Important details of the location choice decision in a linear city have been uncovered by
de Palma et al. (1985), Economides (1986), Rhee et al. (1992), Rath and Zhao (2001), Gal-Or and
Dukes (2003) who have all analyzed conditions that affect how much firms want to differentiate. In the
basic model of D’Aspremont et al. (1979), firms have an incentive to move towards the extremes (the
principle of maximum differentiation), but under certain conditions – when consumer heterogeneity
is large enough, when the curvature of travel cost function is not very high, when important product
attributes are unobserved by the firms, or when demand is elastic – they will locate closer to one
another. Our model sheds light on how consumer participation affects the level of differentiation as
the decision to involve consumers can be thought of as a move towards less differentiation.
In the marketing literature a number of papers, such as, Iyer and Soberman (2000) and Lauga
and Ofek (2009) study the role of market research in resolving demand uncertainty. In our model, we
compare the role of traditional market research and DPD under a specific type of demand uncertainty,
in the linear city setup. In their two papers Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) treat uncertainty
in a similar way, although we use a different distribution. Kro´l (2011) generalizes the measure of
uncertainty, but also finds that more uncertainty leads to softened price competition and increased
firm profits, resulting in a welfare loss. This is consistent with the findings of the literature studying
the role of information in competitive markets, where firms that learn too much may end up in a tough
competition (Raith 1996, Villas-Boas 1994, Chen et al. 2001, Guo and Iyer 2010, Li 2006, Liu and
Serfes 2002, Cabral and Villas-Boas 2005, Zhang 2011) and firms may choose not to learn as much as
they could (Chen and Iyer 2002).
As we model the consumer voting process, our model is also related to the literature on group
decision-making in political economy (Black 1948). Indeed, Hotelling’s original model has been applied
to election candidates by Downs (1957) leading to the Median Voter Theorem, arguing that strategic
candidates will position themselves around the median voter. Our model is different from most of
the literature as we do not allow candidates to be strategic individually, as they are either selected
through a random process or by the firm. We mostly rely on plurality voting which is known to
have inefficiencies when there are more than two candidates (Tullock 1959), therefore several other
mechanisms have been suggested (Levin and Nalebuff 1995). Spatial models have been widely used for
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election candidates (Stokes 1963) and several papers examine the difficulties of the multidimensional
case (McKelvey and Wendell 1976, Calvert 1985). Although several other papers making important
contributions to the theory of elections would be worth noting, we restrict our attention to a few
recent papers that are directly related to parts of our analysis. These include Krishna and Morgan
(2011) who examine voluntary versus compulsory voting, and (Castanheira 2011) who uncover the
implications of voting for a losing candidate. In addition, recent interest in polls and market research
has led to research on information aggregation in polls (Morgan and Stocken 2008) and the possibility
of product flops due to non-truthful strategic answers in consumer surveys (Hummel et al. 2010).
3 Model
3.1 Consumer Preferences
We assume that consumers have heterogeneous tastes along a single dimension. A consumer’s taste
can be described by her location in the unit interval x ∈ [0, 1]. She has a sufficiently high valuation
v for a product that perfectly fits her taste, but has a disutility from products that do not perfectly
fit. Let ri denote the location of product i in the [0, 1] interval. We assume that consumers have a
quadratic travel cost4, making consumer x’s valuation for product i
uxi = v − t(x− ri)2. (1)
We modify the typical linear city model to account for an important reason for soliciting consumer
participation in product design: incomplete information about consumer preferences. We assume that
a unit mass of consumers are either distributed uniformly in the [0, 1/2] interval or uniformly in the
[1/2, 1] interval, calling the former left-sided demand and the latter right-sided demand. Firms do not
know whether demand is left- or right-sided before choosing their location, but it is common knowledge
that nature chooses the demand to be left-sided with probability qL = q ≥ 0, and to be right-sided
with probability qR = 1 − q ≤ 1. Since the setup is symmetric around 1/2 in q, we analyze the
parameter range 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2 throughout the paper. In other words, demand is likely to be right-sided
and q measures the level of uncertainty ranging from 0 to the maximal q = 1/2. This setup is similar
to that by Meagher and Zauner (2004), but unlike them, we use a simple discrete distribution to be
able to focus on consumer involvement rather than the nature of the uncertainty.
4Although Hotelling (1929) assumes a linear travel cost, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist in the pricing
stage when firms are located too close to each other. Therefore, the location choice game does not have a solution in
pure strategies, but using the quadratic formulation suggested by D’Aspremont et al. (1979) ensures an equilbrium.
7
3.2 The Democratic Product Design Process
We refer to the process of consumer controlled product design, in which consumers participate in
generating and voting about the final product, as a Democtratic Product Design (DPD). We begin
by assuming a relatively simple DPD process based on plurality voting, which we call PL(k). We
assume that consumers are non-strategic and they all participate in the voting process5. First, the
firm solicits a k number of product ideas from random consumers, denoted by X1, X2, ..., Xk. Each
consumer will submit a product idea that exactly matches her preference6. That is, a consumer at
location x will present a product idea that, if turned into a product, will be located exactly at x.
After the candidates have been selected, all consumers vote for the k product ideas and the firm will
create a product from the winning product idea. We assume that each consumer votes for the product
candidate that is closest to her taste. The winner will be the candidate with the highest number of
votes.
For example, let us assume that the demand is left-sided and a PL(2) process is used. The firm
solicits product ideas and randomly picks two candidates. The candidate closer to 1/4 will win the
vote. Since consumers are distributed symmetrically around 1/4, the expected location of the winning
product will be 1/4 (or 3/4 if the demand is right-sided). To determine the exact distribution, we
first need to consider the two candidates: X1, X2 and determine which one is closer to 1/4. Simple
calculation7 shows that the distribution of the winning product location (Xw) is given by
Pr(Xw < x) = F
L
w (x) = Fw(x) =
{
8x2 if x ∈ [0, 1/4]
8x(1− x)− 1 if x ∈ [1/4, 1/2] (2)
Not surprisingly, the expected location of the winning candidate is the middle of the interval 1/4, but
the process is not perfect and there can be a substantial amount of error in either direction. As k
increases, a closed form derivation of the distribution becomes increasingly complex, but the numerical
results depicted in Figure 1 paint a clear picture. With a larger k, more extreme candidates have a
higher chance of winning, leading to a bimodal distribution when k is at least 4. As k approaches
infinity the distribution of the winning candidate’s location approaches the uniform distribution that
is also the outcome of a PL(1) process. Interestingly, the expected distance from the middle initially
5We do not need such a strong assumption: it is sufficient to assume that each consumer participates with the same
positive probability, independently from her location.
6Although, we allow for any finite k number of candidates, firms realistically use only a few candidates (two to four)
in most examples.
7The candidate closer to 1/4 can be essentially determined as a maximum of two uniformly distributed variables,
leading to the triangle distribution given in (2).
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Figure 1: The p.d.f. of the winning location in a PL(k) process.
increases with k as more extreme winners become more likely (see Figure 2).
Throughout the paper, we use the PL(2) process as the primary example and calculate the exact
equilibrium outcome for it. However, we will state our results in a more general form. To allow
for more complex DPD processes, we employ a general setup, where we use the distribution of the
winning product’s location to describe the process. When the demand is left-sided, the winning
product’s location will be a random variable Xw with c.d.f. F
L
w (.) = Fw(.) and p.d.f. f
L
w (.) = fw(.).
Since consumers are symmetrically distributed in a half-unit interval, we assume that the distribution is
symmetric with a support of [0, 1/2], such that FLw (x) = 1−FLw (1/2−x), yielding fLw (x) = fLw (1/2−x).
When the demand is right-sided, the same c.d.f is shifted to the [1/2, 1] interval such that FRw (x) =
FLw (x−1/2), that is, fRw (x) = fLw (x−1/2). Furthermore, let σf denote the standard error of the above
distribution.
3.3 Firms
In our general setup, we have two firms manufacturing their products at zero marginal cost that are
identical except for the features that determine their location on the Hotelling line. As our goal is to
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examine the market-level effects of democratic product design and compare it to traditional product
design, we introduce a first stage in which firms simultaneously decide whether to engage in DPD
(denoted by D), use traditional market research (M) or neither (N). Firms observe each other’s
choices of D, M or N and enter the next stage. In this second stage, firms engage in the location
choice subgame that can take different forms depending on firm’s choice of D, M , or N in the first
stage: If Firm i decided to engage in DPD, the DPD process is implemented which determines its
location. We assume that a firm that engages in DPD has to manufacture the exact product consumers
voted for to avoid upsetting them. We study firms’ incentives to deviate from the outcome of the DPD
process at the end of Section 5. If a firm decided to use traditional market research (M) in the first
stage, then it learns the nature of the demand perfectly and picks its product location accordingly.
Finally, if Firm j decided not to use (N) either DPD or traditional market research, it simply picks
a location based on its prior information (q)8. Once locations are determined and observed by both
firms, they also learn whether demand is left- or right-sided. This is natural if at least one of them
uses DPD, as observing the process reveals consumer preferences. Even if neither of them uses DPD,
assuming that preferences are observed is consistent with the notion that unlike locations, prices are
easily changeable. Firms can use different techniques to learn about demand after selling a limited
number of units (Handel et al. 2012). Finally, after prices are set, consumers make their purchases
and payoffs are realized.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Monopoly
Let us first consider the case of a monopolist facing uncertain demand. A unit mass of consumers are
uniformly distributed in [0, 1/2] with probability q or in [1/2, 1] with probability 1− q. We start with
a benchmark case when the firm has to choose the location of its product without learning the exact
nature of demand. In order to be able to compare with the duopoly case and to ensure tractability,
we assume that v is high enough9 so that there is full market coverage and, for the most part, we only
analyze the case of q ≤ 1/2 w.l.o.g.
8Note that locations are determined simultaneously in the location choice subgame, that is, if Firm i uses DPD and
Firm j does not, the outcome of the DPD process will not be observed by Firm j before choosing its location. The
reason for this assumption is that traditional product design may take just as long as running a DPD process, in which
case firms cannot wait for their competitor’s DPD process to conclude to make a location choice. In some cases, it is
plausible that running a DPD process takes much longer than standard location choice and Firm j observes the entire
DPD process run by Firm i before making a choice.
9As we show in the proof the exact assumption is v > 9t/16.
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Once the firm determines its location, it also learns the nature of the demand. If the firm picks
location r ≥ 1/4 and the demand is left-sided, then it will set a price of p(r) = v − tr2, leading to a
profit of piL(r) = v− tr2, whereas if r ≤ 1/4 the profit will be piL(r) = v− t(1/2− r)2. Similarly, if the
demand is right-sided the profit will be piR(r) = v − t(1− r)2, and piR(r) = v − t(1/2− r)2 if r ≤ 3/4
and r ≥ 3/4 respectively. If the firm does not use DPD or market research and it has to rely on its
beliefs about the nature of the demand, its expected profit will be EpiN (r) = qpiL(r) + (1 − q)piR(r).
Note that this function is increasing for r < 1/4 and decreasing for r > 3/4, thus the firm will set
a location in the [1/4, 3/4] interval. Differentiating in this interval with respect to r yields that the
optimal location and profits are
rN =

3/4
1− q
1/4
and piN =

v − t( q2 + 116) if q ∈ [0, 1/4]
v − tq(1− q) if q ∈ [1/4, 3/4]
v − t( 916 − q2) if q ∈ [3/4, 1]
(3)
The above location choice shows how uncertainty about consumer preferences affects the firm’s
optimal product design. If the firm is certain enough that demand is left-sided, it will pick rN = 1/4,
whereas it picks rN = 3/4 if the demand was likely to be right-sided. When demand is certainly left-
or right-sided the firm will make a profit of v − t/16. If there is substantial uncertainty about the
nature of the demand, the firm will pick an intermediate location. The expected profits will be the
lowest when q = 1/2 and the firm picks rN = 1/2 reaching a minimal payoff of v − t/4.
Let us now examine how using DPD affects prices and profits. Without loss of generality, let us
assume that the demand is left-sided. Then, the DPD process leads to an outcome r = Xw with c.d.f
Fw(.). The firm will set a price such that even consumers in location 0 and 1/2 buy the product.
This will lead to a price of pD(r) = v − t(max(r, 1/2 − r))2, leading to a profit of piD(r) = pD(r).
Note that the location Xw is a random variable, therefore we need to determine the expected profit
EpiD(Xw) = Ep
D(Xw) = v − tE(max(Xw, 1/2 − Xw))2. Using the p.d.f. of the distribution of the
winning product design, we get
E(max(Xw, 1/2−Xw))2 =
∫ 1/2
0
(max(x, 1/2− x))2fw(x)dx =
= 2
∫ 1/4
0
(1/2− x)2fw(x)dx < (2/4)
∫ 1/4
0
fw(x)dx = 1/4. (4)
Therefore, we obtain that EpiD(Xw) > v − t/4, showing that when there is substantial uncertainty
about consumer preferences, consumer DPD results in higher profits than direct location choice by
the firm.
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Finally, we consider the third case in which the firm uses traditional market research. After learning
whether demand is left- or right-sided the location choice is trivial: the monopolist will choose the
midpoint of the corresponding interval, resulting in a location of 1/4 or 3/4 and a profit of piM = v− t16 .
The following proposition summarizes the profit implications of the monopolist’s choice.
Proposition 1 When 0 < q ≤ 1/2, the monopolist’s unique optimal choice is to use traditional market
research. In particular:
1. The monopolist makes strictly higher profits using market research than either using DPD or not
using any market research.
2. There exists a 0 < q < 1/2 such that the monopolist will make higher expected profits using DPD
than not using any market research if and only if q < q ≤ 1/2.
The proposition compares the choice between market research and DPD net of any cost advantages
or direct benefits. The results show that using traditional market research is a dominant strategy for
a monopolist. The results can be best understood in light of the basic trade-off between information
acquisition and commitment. When there is sufficient amount of uncertainty about consumer pref-
erences, the advantages of market research or DPD are apparent. Despite the uncertainty, the firm
is able to sell a product that closely matches average consumer preferences, either by involving them
in the design or using traditional market research. We call this a positive learning effect because as
uncertainty about consumer preferences is revealed the firm can offer a product that fits consumer
needs better, resulting in a higher profit. However, DPD has disadvantages as it does not yield an
optimal product due to the imperfections in the process. The larger the potential error in the DPD
process the farther the expected product location is from the ideal profit maximizing point. We call
this a negative commitment effect because no matter how small the error is, the firm loses money by
offering a suboptimal product that it committed to in the DPD. By using traditional market research,
the monopolist can avoid this negative effect and learn consumer demand without any commitment
to a potentially suboptimal product. Therefore, using market research is a strictly dominant strategy
even though DPD has the same learning value.
However, DPD and market research may involve different costs. For example if DPD costs signifi-
cantly less, the monopolist may find it optimal to use DPD. The second point of the proposition shows
that this is true if and only if there is sufficient uncertainty about consumer preferences. The intuition
12
follows clearly from the trade-off identified above as the positive information effect will outweigh the
negative commitment effect only if the uncertainty is relatively high. Also, market research typically
does not provide perfect information in a realistic setting. Depending on the amount spent on mar-
ket research might provide worse information than DPD. In this case, the monopolist would have to
trade off the better information gained from DPD for the necessary commitment. Furthermore, as
we elaborate in Section 7, consumers may directly benefit from DPD if they enjoy the involvement in
the product design process. This might also drive the monopolist to use DPD instead of traditional
market research.
Since a monopolist may have various reasons to use DPD as explained above, it is useful to examine
how the profits depend on the exact DPD process employed. As we determined previously, firm profits
under DPD are EpiD = v−2t ∫ 1/40 (1/2−x)2fw(x)dx in the case of a general DPD outcome distribution.
When the DPD process is a simple DPD process of a majority choice between k = 2 candidates, that
is, when fw(x) = f
(2)
w (x) = 16x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/4, the exact solution is EpiD(Xw) = v − (11/96)t. If
the monopolist uses more than two candidates, the profits initially decrease as k increases, because
extreme candidates have a higher likelihood of winning the vote (see Figure 2). In fact, when k is 15
or more, the monopolist’s profits are lower than in the case of simply picking a random consumer’s
ideal product. In summary, if the monopolist chooses to utilize DPD, it can maximize profits by using
only two candidates in the process.
4.2 Duopoly
We continue the analysis by examining the duopoly case, where firms first simultaneously decide
whether to use DPD, traditional market research or neither, then determine their locations, and finally
set prices. Using backward induction, we first consider the nine possible location choice subgames after
the DPD/market research decision has been made. We divide these cases into three categories based
on whether firms use DPD: i) neither firm engages in DPD and they choose their location, ii) one firm
engages in DPD while the other chooses its location, iii) both firms use DPD, thereby determining
their locations.
Firms do not use DPD. In the subgames where firms do not use DPD, they both have a location
decisions to make. They can either conduct traditional market research to aid this decision or rely
only on their prior information about demand. For example, if both firms use market research and
they find out that the demand is right-sided, the location choice game is equivalent to the classic
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Figure 2: The expected distance of the winning candidate from the midpoint in a PL(k) process and
monopoly profits when using it (v = t = 1). The dashed line depicts the baseline value obtained when
using a simple uniform sampling (equivalent to a PL(1) process).
linear city model (with the exception that consumers are distributed in [1/2, 1] instead of the typical
[0, 1]). As D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show, the principle of maximum differentiation applies and firms
locate far from each other. One caveat of this principle is that in linear city models firms are typically
not allowed outside the interval where consumers are located, therefore they locate at the endpoints.
However, firms have an incentive to move even further out: the equilibrium locations are (−1/4, 5/4)
when consumers are located in the [0, 1] interval. Since our model assumes uncertainty about consumer
locations, we allow firms to locate anywhere on the real line. In case of a certain right-sided demand
this translates to locations (3/8, 9/8) and to profits of piMMi = pi
MM
j = 3t/16
If firms do not learn about consumer preferences through market research, their locations will be
more dispersed. For example, when q = 1/2, they will locate at (1/12, 11/12). In general, as priors
about the location of the demand become more diffused, firms will locate farther apart from each other
to cover all possible consumer locations:
Lemma 1 When neither firm uses DPD or market research, firms’ locations and profits are
rNNi (q) =
4q2 − 16q + 9
24
, rNNj (q) =
27− 4q2 − 8q
24
, piNNi (q) = pi
NN
j (q) =
t(4q2 − 4q − 9)2
432
.
Note that firms make lower profits when they both use market research than when they do not
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(3t/16 compared to 25t/108, when q = 1/2). This result is consistent with a stream of literature
arguing that more information about the demand can hurt firms by leading to tougher price compe-
tition (Raith 1996). However, as we show in the proof of Proposition 2, firms have an incentive to
use market research when their competitor does not, therefore an equilibrium with neither firm using
neither DPD nor market research is not sustainable.
Only one firms uses DPD. Moving on to the second category, we assume that only Firm 1
engages in DPD. Firm 2 either uses traditional market research or relies only on its priors to determine
its location. We start with the case when Firm 2 does not use market research and determine its best
response (in location choice) to Firm 1’s choice of DPD. Note that Firm 2 does not observe the
outcome of Firm 1’s DPD process, but it knows the distribution of potential outcomes. The p.d.f. of
this distribution is
f(x) =
{
q · fw(x) if x ∈ [0, 1/2]
(1− q) · fw(x− 1/2) if x ∈ [1/2, 1] , (5)
where fw() is the p.d.f. of the DPD process in the case of a left-sided demand and σf is its standard
error. Maximizing the expected profit of Firm 2 along its possible location choices, we get the best
response.
Lemma 2 There exists a σ > 0 such that if σf < σ and 0 < q < 1/2 then Firm 2’s unique best
response to Firm 1’s choice of using DPD is to locate at
r2(q) =
7
4
− q +
√
q2 − q + 1 + 4σ
2
f
3
2
> 1.
We obtain that if the DPD process is relatively precise, resulting in a product close to the middle
of the interval where consumers are located, the best response is to pick a far right location that is
outside the range of possible consumer locations. This is a unique best response as long as 0 < q < 1/2.
Naturally, when q = 0 and the demand is certainly right-sided Firm 2 will be indifferent between
picking 1 + y and 1/2 − y for any y and when q = 1/2, Firm 2 will be indifferent between 1 + y
and −y. However, when demand is likely to be right-sided, but there is a small chance of it being
left-sided, Firm 2 wants to locate relatively far from the [1/2, 1], where Firm 1 will be located around
the center (3/4) with a high probability, but also wants to avoid [0, 1/2] where Firm 1 can show up
with a positive probability (see Figure 3).
The combination of these two manifestations of the principle of maximum differentiation results in
a location r2 > 1 when demand is more likely to be right sided.
10 Note that these results hold when
10When demand is more likely to be left-sided Firm 2 will locate left of 0.
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Figure 3: Firm 2’s profit as a function of its location r2, when Firm 1 uses a PL(2) DPD. The three curves
show profit function for three levels of uncertainty and the vertical lines point out the best response.
the DPD process is relatively centered with a low variance. All of the PL(k) processes satisfy this
condition and result in the above mentioned extreme best response.
In essence, when Firm 1 uses DPD and Firm 2 does not use any market research, Firm 1 ends
up in a central location and Firm 2’s best response is outside of this central zone. The outcome is
similar when Firm 2 uses market research (while Firm 1 still uses DPD). If, for example, demand is
right-sided Firm 2 can now observe this and give a slightly better response. In fact, the best response
will be symmetric around [1/2, 1], but, as we show in the proof of Proposition 2, this case is equivalent
to the above analysis with q = 0. Hence, Firm 1 again ends up in a central location with Firm 2
pushed out to the side.
Both firms use DPD. In the third case, where both firms engage in DPD, neither of them has to
make a location choice. Their location is simply determined by the DPD processes. The locations will
be given by two random draws from the distribution with p.d.f. fLw (.) or f
R
w (.) (depending on whether
demand is left- or right sided), bringing the two firms substantially closer than in the first subgame
and likely closer than in the second subgame. Note that the level of uncertainty (q) does not affect
the expected payoff as the DPD process will ensure a product that is mostly centered in the consumer
preference interval no matter if demand is left- or right-sided.
Use of DPD in equilbrium. Combining the above explored subgames allows us to determine
the equilibrium of the first stage and see when firms engage in DPD. We examine both the pure- and
mixed-strategies in the first stage where firms decide whether to use DPD. We obtain the following
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results. Recall that σf denotes the standard error of the DPD process defined by f(.).
Proposition 2
1. There exists a σ′ > 0 such that if σf < σ′ then the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is asymmetric
with one firm using traditional market research and the other engaging in DPD.
2. If σf < σ
′, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed first-stage strategies in which firms
use DPD with a positive probability 0 < P < 1 and use market research with probability 1− P .
3. The PL(2) process satisfies σPL(2) < σ
′ and P = 175226 · 4176−311
√
146
3237−245√146 ≈ 0.494.
The proposition demonstrates that if DPD tends to result in a product that is not too far from
average consumer preferences then only one firm engages in DPD, whereas its competitor uses tradi-
tional market research. The intuition can be best described relying on the learning and commitment
components of DPD and market research identified in the monopoly analysis. The positive learning
effect of market research and DPD are the same as these activities provide a perfect signal about the
nature of the demand. Using either of these gives a firm an advantage if its competitor is not perfectly
informed and vice versa. Thus, as long as DPD and market research are not too costly, not using
either of them is a dominated strategy.
The choice between DPD and market research is driven by the commitment effect. When using
DPD, a firm commits to the product design that consumers vote for. This product design is likely to
be close to the average preferences, not at an extreme location as we would expect under standard
product differentiation. That is, by using DPD, a firm can commit to not consider differentiation. The
best its competitor can do, if not using DPD, is select an extremely differentiated location. Hence,
firms have a clear incentive to use DPD if their competitor does not. On the other hand, firms do not
want to copy their competitors by using DPD as profits suffer tremendously if firms locate close to
each other resulting in intense price competition.
The mixed strategy equilibrium directly corresponds to the above described asymmetric equilib-
rium. When firms cannot coordinate in who will engage in DPD, they will both mix and choose DPD
with the given probability and market research otherwise. It is interesting to note that the choice of
DPD preempts the coordination problem encountered when both firms have to pick their locations
in the second stage. Although the locations are fully determined in equilibrium, firms have to decide
who will on the left and who will be on the right. Usually firms have a history of being on one or the
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other side, but if there is no such coordination device, the choice of DPD can dissolve this coordination
problem. In the mixed strategy equilibrium it is still possible that firms both have to choose locations,
but the probability is fairly low.
It is useful to compare the profits firms can expect in different scenarios. When considering the
asymmetric equilibrium - which is clearly beneficial for the firm using DPD ex post - we can calculate
the profit a firm can expect ex ante when randomly assigned to a role as half of the total industry
profits. These are strictly lower than if both firms used traditional market research or neither of them
used market research. The expected profits are reduced even more in the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium where both firms might use DPD at the same time. Firm profits are thus hurt by the use
of DPD due to the strategic effects of commitment. On the other hand, consumer surplus increases as
a result of DPD as consumers are better off both in the asymmetric equilibrium and the symmetric
mixed equilibrium. The increased consumer surplus is not only a result of products in the market that
fit the average consumer’s taste better, but also a result of increased price competition.
5 Deviation from Consumer Votes
An important question regarding democratic product design is whether firms have an incentive to
follow consumer votes or potentially deviate from them. In practice, firms have various options to
manipulate the results in more or less obvious ways, but consumers may be upset if the final product
is different from what they voted for and this negative sentiment could translate into a decreased
valuation for the product. Although most examples of democratic product design show that firms
follow the vote results, there is anecdotal evidence that consumers do penalize firms for breaking
their promises in general. Indeed, an Accenture study11 reports, with respect to marketing and sales
practices, that 59% of consumers finds it “extremely frustrating” if firms “promise one thing but
deliver another”. Another study12 found that 38% of respondents switched to another product soon
after experiencing a broken promise and 52% considered switching.
In this section, we incorporate the decreased valuation from a potentially broken promise. As
opposed to the basic model, where we assume that firms that choose to engage in DPD keep their
11“2012 Global Consumer Pulse Research”, Accenture, 2012 -
available at http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-Global-Consumer-Pulse-Research-
Study-2012-Key-Findings.pdf (accessed August 12, 2014)
12“Promises, Promises: Easily Made, Easily Broken”, Accenture, 2012 -
available at http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-Broken-Promises-Survey-Retain-
Customers.pdf
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promise to consumers and implement the product winning the consumer vote, we now formally model
how firms are penalized for deviating from the vote outcome. We allow firms to select a location
different from the DPD outcome in the second stage of the game. Consumers then observe both the
DPD outcome and the product’s final location which, if different from the winner in the vote, reduces
their valuation. We modify equation (1) to include this reduction in utility when Firm i uses DPD:
uxi = v − t(x− ri)2 −D(gi, x, ri, Xwi) (6)
where D(gi, x,Xiw) is the disutility experienced by consumer at location x when the product offered
by Firm i is located at ri instead of the vote outcome of Xwi. The parameter gi measures how
sensitive consumers are to Firm i’s deviations from the DPD outcome. There are various different
possible formulations for the consumer disutility. Here, we present an analytically well tractable
functional form, where the disutility increases with the distance the final product has moved from the
vote outcome, but making sure that consumers do not value a product less if it came closer to them.
Formally, we set
D(gi, x, ri, Xwi) = min
{
git|ri −Xwi|, t(x− ri)2 − t(x−Xwi)2
}
(7)
The first term simply measures how far the final product is from the vote outcome, whereas the second
term ensures that the disutility cannot exceed the utility improvement from the reduced travel costs.
Therefore, consumers will never value a product lower if it is closer to them than a more distant vote
outcome. However, they certainly do penalize the firm when the product moves farther away than the
vote outcome. We use gi to measure how much the distance affects the disutility and the t multiplier
to rescale to the same unit as the travel costs. Consequently, when gi = 0, Firm i is free to pick any
location regardless of the vote outcome without worrying about consumer backlash, making this case
equivalent to using traditional market research. On the other hand, a sufficiently high gi captures a
situation where consumers penalize the firm for deviating from the vote outcome.
In the remainder of this section, we first examine the case of gi = gj = g and analyze how the
equilibrium of the model changes with g. Then, we endogenize the value of gi by allowing firms to
make stronger or weaker promises about sticking with consumer choice. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the winning product’s distribution is sufficiently centered (σf is small).
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5.1 Use of DPD in equilibrium
The penalty for deviating from the DPD outcome does not substantially affect a monopolist’s choice.
The optimal strategy is to use market research regardless of consumer sensitivity. The case of a
duopoly is more complex. Similarly to the analysis of the main model, we first consider the location
subgames after each firm decided whether to use DPD, market research, or neither.
In the case where both firms use DPD, they will be able to profitably move away from each other
and the center when g is low enough. As g approaches 0, they will be differentiated to the same extent
as if they both used market research. When only one firm uses DPD, we observe a similar trend,
but the consequences are different. As g decreases, the firm using DPD moves out from its dominant
central position, whereas its competitor can move closer to the center (still keeping a substantial
distance). In this case, lowering g reduces the asymmetry in profits, hurting the firm using DPD, but
helping its competitor.
Combining the different subgames, we determine the DPD choice equilibrium for different values
of g > 0 below. We naturally expect a high g to replicate the results of Proposition 2, whereas g = 0
implies that firms are indifferent between DPD and market research since, in effect, these two are
equivalent.
Proposition 3 If σf is small enough, there exist 0 < gA < gB < gC such that the equilibria in pure
strategies have the following properties.
1. If 0 < g < gA, then both firms use traditional market research in the unique equilibrium.
2. If gB < g < gC , then both firms use DPD in the unique equilibrium.
3. If gA < g < gB or if gC < g, then one firm uses DPD while the other employs market research
in the unique equilibrium.
The results are consistent with our intuition high values of g, but reveal an interesting pattern for
intermediate values. When consumers are moderately sensitive to deviations from the vote outcome,
both firms use DPD in equilibrium. The reason is that they can maintain a reasonable level of
differentiation by moving away from each other. The asymmetric equilibrium is not sustainable,
because the firm using market research, forced far out of the market, now has an incentive to be
offensive and also use DPD. This results in a prisoner’s dilemma, as firms make strictly lower profits
when they both use DPD, than when they use market research. For a small range of g values we again
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obtain the asymmetric equilibrium. Finally, when consumers are only slightly sensitive to deviations
and g is low, both firms use traditional market research. The reason is that, the asymmetric setting
(one using DPD, the other market research) is unfavorable to the firm using DPD. It restricts its
strategy space, but does not provide enough commitment power to force its competitor to the edge
of the market. The above pattern of results nicely illustrates how the role of DPD changes as the
strength of the commitment to the vote outcome diminishes.
5.2 Self-imposed penalty for deviating
The extent to which consumers are sensitive to deviations from the outcome of a potential vote can
often be influenced by the firm engaging in DPD. For example, increasing the transparency of the
process makes it easier for consumers to follow the vote. Making widely broadcasted promises upfront
also leads consumers to expect the firm to stick with the vote outcome, whereas warning consumers that
the vote outcome may not be implemented (possibly because of feasibility constraints) can neutralize
the negative sentiments.
We therefore endogenize the choice of gi and allow firms to determine the level of penalty for
deviating from the vote outcome. To focus on the strategic effects, we assume that there is no direct
cost or benefit to any particular choice of gi value and to maintain analytical tractability, we assume
that firms can choose between two discrete levels of gi. Firms can either set gi = 0 or gi = g > 0. We
show that if g is large enough, then at least one firm sets gi = g in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 If σf is small enough, then using the thresholds 0 < gA < gB < gC from Proposition 3,
we get the following equilibria.
1. If 0 < g < gA, there is no equilibrium where a firm sets gi = g and then uses DPD.
2. If gB < g < gC , then both firms set g1 = g2 = g and they both use DPD in the unique equilibrium.
3. If gA < g < gB or if gC < g, then in any equilibrium there is exactly one firm setting gi = g and
using DPD.
The intuition follows from the previous results. When g is low, it is not possible to commit to the
DPD outcome and firms will just use market research. As g increases, it becomes possible to commit
to DPD to some extent. When gB < g < gC , firms will end up in a prisonser’s dilemma: both of them
will set g1 = g2 = g and both will engage in DPD. They are able to differentiate somewhat, but will
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be located relatively close to the vote outcomes that are themselves close to each other. Finally, when
a very strong commitment to the DPD outcome is possible, such that gC < g (or gA < g < gB), there
will be multiple equilibria, where one or both firms set gi = g. In the DPD subgame one firm will
always use DPD and not deviate from the vote results, whereas the other firm will freely position its
product either by using traditional market research right away or using DPD, but deviating because of
setting its gi to 0. Eventually, firms will end up at the same locations as in the asymmetric equilibrium
of our main model. Hence, this case essentially replicates our main results.
In summary, we show that if there is a tool for firms to strongly self-commit then at least one of
them will always do. If the self-commitment tool is very effective, then exactly one firm will commit
to and engage in DPD, whereas if it is moderately effective, both firms will commit to and engage in
DPD. In the latter case, firms cannot resist the potential advantage of self-committing, but by both
of them doing it, they end up in a price war with reduced profits. When the self-commitment tool is
not effective no firm will commit to and go through with DPD.
6 Manipulating the Vote by Preselecting Candidates
As we have shown so far, firms employing DPD generally have an incentive to deviate from the vote
outcome in the absense of a commitment device. When consumers do not punish firms for such
deviations, DPD becomes very similar to traditional market research. In this section we study how
firms can have more control over the DPD outcome even if they commit to the formal vote results in
fear of a consumer backlash.
Firms often solicit consumers for their ideas and put these up for a vote (MyStarbcuksIdea, Lego,
Burberry). In fact, most crowdsourcing platforms rely on ideas submitted directly by consumers. But
instead of soliciting candidates for a majority vote from random consumers, the firm can pick candi-
dates itself and have consumers vote on them. Sometimes firms admittedly generate the candidates
themselves, in other examples, even though the process is fairly transparent, firms can employ very
long campaigns where they can have a good amount of flexibility in determining the final candidates.
For example, the Dewmocracy campaign lasted for sixteen months and initially started with seventeen
candidates that were later narrowed down to three in the final where most consumers participated. In
such a long and complex campaign firms have the opportunity to introduce their own candidates with-
out upsetting consumers. But even in cases where firms solicit original consumer ideas, it is possible
that the firm has some influence. Starbucks’ top winning consumer idea, “Splash Sticks” (supposedly
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selected from 80,000 consumer ideas) turned out to be a product feature that was already used by the
company in Japan.
To give more control to firms over the final outcome in our model, we slightly modify the PL(k)
process. We denote this process by PREPL(k): a firm using DPD selects k candidates that do not
have to coincide with any consumer’s taste. The winner is decided by a majority vote where consumers
are not strategic and each of them votes for her favorite product. If consumers are indifferent between
two products they pick one randomly and, in case of a tie for the top design, the firm picks the
winner.13 We start by showing that a firm can achieve essentially any location combination rL < rR
if it can pre-select a high enough number of candidates.
Lemma 3 If rL < rR and 0 < rL + rR < 2, then there exists a k such that a firm can ensure that
the outcome of the DPD process is rL in case of a left-sided demand and rR in case of a right-sided
demand by pre-selecting the candidates in a PREPL(k) process with a k ≥ k.
Thus, by choosing enough candidates firms can achieve complete freedom in location choice and only
take advantage of the informational effect of DPD by learning whether demand is left- or right-sided.
Therefore, if we modify by the basic model presented in Section 3 to use the PREPL(k) process,
firms will be indifferent between using marketing research and DPD as long as k is high enough. Below,
we determine the minimum number of candidates needed to achieve this.
Corollary 2 Firms can achieve the equivalent of traditional market research using DPD and PREPL(k)
iff k ≥ 4.
In essence, using four preselected candidates or more gives firms complete freedom in their location
choice even if they fully commit to the vote outcome. Although in our model firms are then indifferent
between DPD and market research they may have a preference for one or the other depending on
the costs. Also, as we examine in Section 7, DPD potentially has other benefits. Preselecting the
candidates allows firms to take advantage of these without braking any promises.
One caveat of the above results is that firms need to use a number of identical candidates that
consumers might find odd. Also, some candidates may be outside of the area where consumers are
located, leading to candidates that are obviously not desired by any consumer. Imposing some restric-
tions to make the setting more realistic gives similar results where firms can achieve outcomes similar
13This assumption is not critical, but makes the analysis cleaner.
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to as if they used market research. We present one such more realistic result where firms are restricted
to two candidates.
We solve our full basic model presented in Section 3 with modification that any firm using DPD
can use the PREPL(2) DPD process.
Corollary 3 When firms are restricted to a PREPL(2) DPD process, they both decide to use DPD
in equilibrium. Firm locations will be either
rLi = 0, r
L
j = 1/2, r
R
i = 1/2, r
R
j = 1, or
rLi = −1/6, rLj = 1/2, rRi = 7/6, rRj = 1/2.
In essence, even if firms can only use two pre-selected candidates for a majority vote, they will both
engage in DPD. Since firms are able to differentiate less, they make lower profits than if they both used
traditional market research, resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma. We have thus shown that although it
might be tempting for firms to exercise more control over the final product, this may be a trap leading
to intense price competition and lower profits.
7 Consumer Engagement in DPD
A common argument for DPD is that it directly creates value by increasing the utility that consumers
get from the product. In other words, consumers are willing to pay more for a product if it was created
with their involvement than for the exact same product designed solely by the firm. Fuchs et al. (2010)
show that consumers who are empowered to vote for a product exhibit an increased willingness to pay
for it, but this benefit diminishes if the outcome does not reflect their preferences. In this section we
examine both the positive and potentially negative effects that engagement may have on consumer
valuation. We first study how the equilibrium changes if consumers that participate in DPD have
an increased valuation for the winning product. Then we consider the potential disutility consumers
receive from voting for a product design that is not supported by the majority.
7.1 Increased valuation from engagement
To account for the potential direct, valuation-increasing effect of DPD, we modify our basic model
and incorporate an extra term in the consumer utility formulation of (1). We begin our analysis by
assuming that consumer x’s valuation for product j is
uxi = vb + vdi − t(x− ri)2, (8)
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where the utility derived from an ideally designed product v = vb+vdi now includes a base component
and a DPD component. The extra value derived from DPD is vdi = vd > 0 if Firm i engages in DPD
and vdi = 0 otherwise. Aside from this modification the model setup remains the same. Our goal is
to investigate how the results change as vd increases from 0.
We first look at a monopolist along the same lines as in Section 4.1. After finding out whether
demand is left- or right-sided, the monopolist using DPD sets a price so that even consumers at
the extremes buy its product. For a left-sided demand and a location r this results in a profit
v − t(max(r, 1/2 − r))2. This is clearly increasing in v and using v = vb + vd it is also increasing in
vd. Hence, for any given DPD outcome the monopolist will make higher profits if vd increases. The
results are the same for a right-sided demand, demonstrating that regardless of the DPD process used,
a monopolist always benefits from increased consumer valuation of engagement in the DPD process.
As a consequence, if vd is high enough the monopolist will find it profitable to use DPD instead of
relying on traditional market research.
Moving on to the case of a duopoly, we note that in horizontal differentiation models an increased
consumer valuation for both firms does not change the equilibrium as competition prevents firms from
increasing prices enough for valuations to be binding (as long as valuations are high). Therefore, we do
not expect any change in the subgames where both or neither firms use DPD. However, an asymmetry
is created in valuations in the subgame where only one firm uses DPD. The increased valuation gives an
advantage to the firm that uses DPD and its profits will be increasing in vd, whereas its competitor’s
profits will be decreasing. As we show below, above a certain threshold this asymmetry becomes
significant and results in a different equilibrium.
Proposition 4 There exists a vd > 0, such that, if vd > vd then both firms use DPD. Equilibrium
profits will be strictly lower than if neither firm used DPD regardless of the DPD process used.
The result highlights an interesting strategic aspect of DPD. As the value of consumer engagement
in the DPD process increases, firms are more likely to engage in DPD which leads to a reduction in
profits. The intuition is as follows: the direct increase in consumer valuation makes it attractive for
firms to engage in DPD and makes it especially unattractive not to engage in it, when the other firm
does so. In other words, as consumers value the engagement in DPD more, the asymmetric outcome
becomes less favorable for a firm that does not use DPD. Not only can its competitor better position
its product covering a large percentage of consumer preferences, but DPD can also provide extra
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benefits to the customers. Unlike in the benchmark case of vd = 0, when the firm not using DPD in
the asymmetric case was able to make reasonable profits by positioning itself at one extreme, DPD
is a dominant strategy when vd is high enough. Compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the
basic model, we show that profits are lower.
Corollary 4 If vd > vd and a PL(2) process is used, profits will be strictly lower than the expected
profits in the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Proposition 2 for the case of vd = 0.
This leads us to the conclusion that a seemingly beneficial increased engagement value of DPD can
be dangerous for firms. Similar to a Bertrand supertrap, an increase in vd leads to a higher likelihood
of imitation of the decision to engage in DPD. Eventually, this results in reduced profits as both
firms start using DPD inducing intense price competition. Thus, firms should be careful in increasing
consumer engagement in their DPD process as even a unilateral increase in consumer benefits could
trigger a response by competitors to use DPD and increase engagement on their side.
7.2 Voting for a loser
DPD certainly requires more or less consumer involvement and we have shown how the positive effects
of engagement change firms’ strategies. However, in a majority vote not all voters are necessarily
happy with the results. We already capture the first order disutility consumers face when the chosen
product is not perfect by employing the typical horizontal travel cost formulation. In some cases this
may not be enough. For a given customer and given design outcome, it is plausible that consumers
like the product more if they voted for it than if they did not. In the beginning of this section we
introduced vd to measure the extra utility consumers get from engaging in the DPD process. Below,
we examine what happens when consumers’ valuation of a product is affected by whether they voted
for it or not. Therefore, we redefine vdi as
vdi = vdix =

0 if firm i does not use DPD
vd if consumer x voted for the winning product candidate of firm i
vd − vn if consumer x voted for a non-winning product candidate of firm i
Our previous setup is a special case of this more general setting with vn = 0. Here vn > 0 measures
the negative utility consumers get from voting for a product candidate that does not win the vote. As
before, we assume that consumers are non-strategic and simply vote for the product that is closest to
their location.
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We first examine the monopoly case and for tractability, we focus on a PL(2) process. When there
are two randomly selected candidates, it is fairly easy to determine the distribution of the set of voters
who voted for the winner. Let us assume that the demand is left-sided and consumers are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1/2]. We provided the distribution of the location of the winning candidate in (2).
Here, we determine who could have voted for the winning candidate given its location. IfXw = r ≤ 1/4,
then there are two cases: the competing, non-winning candidate (Xn) was positioned either to the
left or the right of Xw. If Xn < r then it could have been anywhere between 0 and Xw. However, if
Xn > r it had to be between 1/2− r and 1/2. Therefore, the distribution of (Xn|Xw = r) is uniform
in [0, r] ∪ [1/2 − r, 1/2]. Hence the set of consumers who did not vote for the winning candidate is
[0, Xˆ] with 1/2 probability and [1/2 − Xˆ, 1] with 1/2 probability where Xˆ is distributed uniformly
between r/2 and r. More importantly, for the monopoly case, the extreme consumer on the left voted
for the winner with exactly 1/2 probability conditional on any Xw = r location. We now examine how
a monopolist is affected by the differentiated consumer valuations.
Lemma 4 If the monopolist uses a PL(2) process, then its expected profit is
EpiD =
{
vb + vd − 23 v
2
n(3t−4vn)
t2
− 11t96 if vn ≤ t/4
vb + vd − vn2 − 7t96 if vn > t/4
Apparently, the monopolist’s expected profit is decreasing in vn, that is, a negative sentiment
about not voting for the winning product always hurts the monopolist. The derivative ranges from
0 to −1/2 as vn increases, while the derivative with respect to vd is +1, showing that although the
negative effects of consumer engagement cannot be ignored, they are outweighed by an increase of the
same magnitude in the positive effects. In other words, consumer excitement about the voting process
will only reduce profits if consumers who did not vote for the winning product are significantly more
upset (in this model twice as much) than how satisfied those are who voted for the winning product.
We now analyze how profits are affected by a change in vn > 0 in the case of duopoly. As we have
seen above a high enough vd makes both firms use DPD, thus, we focus on this particular subgame.
We assume that both firms use a PL(2) DPD process and determine how their profits change as a
function of vn. For simplicity we restrict our attention to values of vn that are not too high. This
way, we are able to avoid discontinuities in the profit functions in the relevant intervals. We expect
the same results to hold for larger values, but the analysis becomes more tedious.
Proposition 5 There exists a vn > 0 such that if vn < vn then expected equilibrium prices and profits
are increasing in vn.
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Surprisingly, a negative sentiment about the winning product can increase firm profits in a duopoly
setting. The intuition is rather intriguing. Depending on the outcome of the two DPD processes there
are cases where the negative sentiment is irrelevant because the marginal consumers (those who are
close to being indifferent between the two products) either voted for both or neither of the two firms’
winning products. In these cases prices and profits are not affected by an increase in vn. However, there
are potential outcomes where a negative sentiment can shift the location of the indifferent customers,
as consumers who are otherwise indifferent voted for one but not the other winning product. This
gives an advantage to the firm whose winning product the indifferent customers voted for, but since
our setup is symmetric the exact opposite situation happened with the same probability. Pairing
and integrating over these asymmetric outcomes we have to add up pairs where one firm had a
valuation advantage. The sum of profits will be higher than in the case of no valuation difference
because the asymmetry induces extra differentiation. In other words, firms benefit from more negative
sentiments because in the cases when these sentiments differentiate between firms, price competition
is softened, leading to higher profits. Thus, negative sentiments create extra differentiation with a
positive probability leading to higher profits. In essence, consumers can spontaneously reinforce the
differentiation initiated by firms.
In summary, this section demonstrates how consumer engagement affects firms using DPD. As
one would expect, positive engagement makes DPD a more attractive option for the monopolist. If
consumer product valuations increase enough in a DPD process, the monopolist will prefer DPD
over traditional market research. A negative engagement hurts a monopolist, although to a lesser
extent. Surprisingly, these results reverse in duopoly due to the strategic effects of DPD. An increased
positive engagement value for consumers gives an incentive for firms to imitate their competitors by
using DPD. This intensifies price competition due to a smaller distance between firms. However, a
negative sentiment about a winning product design that the consumer did not vote for can create
extra differentiation between firms, leading to higher prices and profits.
An important implication of these results is that firms should be considerate of the level and nature
of consumer engagement they wish to achieve as they can find themselves in a trap with intense price
competition. They should also pay extra attention to how they run their “election campaigns” as
negative sentiments from the losers can negatively affect profits in a monopoly. On the other hand,
in a competitive environment negative sentiments can serve as a tool to differentiate and alienating
consumer who will buy a competitor’s product anyway is not necessarily detrimental. For example, if
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avid Coke fans are upset by the fact that a Coke-like candidate did not win Dewmocracy may actually
help Mountain Dew differentiate its new product.
8 Conclusion
Voting on products and features is an increasingly popular tool among firms to increase consumer
participation in product design. In this paper we study the strategic implications of using a democratic
product design process. Our main results show that the commitment to the results of consumers’ votes
has a crucial impact on firm strategies. Even when uncertainty is low and firms cannot learn much
about consumer preferences, using consumer votes serves as a commitment device for a firm that wants
to dominate the market by positioning its product for the average consumer. Doing so provides such
a major strategic advantage that at least one firm will make sure that its voting process is transparent
and free of manipulations.
Before discussing the implications of our results we acknowledge a number of limitations of our
approach. We assume that consumers are non-strategic in participating and simply vote for their
favorite product candidate. It is possible that loyalty plays a role in consumer participation and mostly
consumers who already prefer a product take part in the vote. This would alleviate the differentiation
concerns, but, at the same time, would reduce the learning benefits due to the biased results.
The model also incorporates demand uncertainty in a limited fashion. Our assumption that demand
is uniform either in the [0, 1/2] or [1/2, 1] interval is overly simplistic. In practice, it would be easy for
firms to identify the true nature of demand by just asking a single random consumer. However, our
model does capture the main forces that would be possibly at work in a more complex setting, where
the priors about demand are more dispersed. For example, Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005) also
assume that demand is uniform in a given interval, but they assume the midpoint of the interval itself
to be also uniformly distributed. Extending our model to this setting would create a more realistic
scenario, but also increase the complexity of the analysis. Nevertheless, the basic tradeoff we identified
with respect to DPD would likely still hold: if two competitors both use DPD, they both benefit by
learning the true nature of demand, but at the same time risk positioning too close to each other.
Finally, another limitation is that we only consider a single dimension of product features. This
is a standard technique, but not always realistic. In reality there may be several product attributes
that are relevant which could make the voting and differentiation strategies more complex. We also
assume that the single dimension along which firms differentiate is observable by firms and consumers
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and that all the possibly desired product features are feasible to manufacture. If the product that
consumers really want is not feasible to make and consumers are very sensitive to deviations from the
vote results, firms would not want to use DPD. A related limitation is that our result primarily apply
to markets where the main forces point towards maximal differentiation. The literature identifies
several conditions when this is not the case and firms have an incentive to move close to each other.
However, our intuition applies as long as there is one dimension along which firms would want to
differentiate. We believe that despite these limitations our model is robust to various modifications.
Our results have important practical implications for firms planning to or already involving con-
sumers in product design. The results especially apply to firms that use social media to run campaigns
permitting a large number of consumers to vote for their products or features. When a firm does not
face competition in a given product category, but consumer preferences are mostly unknown - a typical
scenario for a first mover in a new, innovative product category - consumer participation is only useful
to the firm if it provides cost savings over traditional market research or extra promotional benefits.
Competition, however, changes many aspects of consumer involvement and could drastically change
desirable firm actions. The firm should consider the potential effects on their ability to differentiate,
but at the same time realize the ability of commitment that democratic product design provides. That
is why it makes sense for a dominant player in the market to involve customers in the product design
to serve the taste of mainstream customer. For example, Mountain Dew is considered a market leader
in the non-cola carbonated soft drink category with the highest market share14 among soft drinks
excluding Coke, Diet Coke and Diet Pepsi. On the other hand, for a firm that achieves a monopoly
position in the market after squeezing out its competitors, it possibly makes sense to stop involving
customers in decisions about product features. An interesting example is that of Facebook and its
recent proposal to end the practice of letting users vote about how the company manages user data
and privacy.15
It is important for firms to carefully consider the rules of consumer participation. For example,
when placing questions and polls on a brand fan page, the firm should make a clear decision on the level
of transparency and the intention to follow the outcome. Clear promises showing a strong commitment
cannot only be appealing to consumers, but can also deter direct competitors from attacking the
mainstream market. At the same time, competitors should keep in mind that if consumers really like
14Beverage-Digest Newsletter, March 2011 http://www.beverage-digest.com/pdf/top-10 2011.pdf
15“The end of digital democracy? Facebook wants to take away your right to vote” CNN, Nov 22 2012
http://http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/22/tech/social-media/facebook-democracy/index.html
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to participate in product design and they value brands running polls highly, firms may find themselves
in a trap. If both firms try to appeal to consumers by publicly asking their opinion they risk getting
similar suggestions from consumers. If they both implement these suggestions, they loose their ability
to differentiate and might find themselves in intense price competition.
Although most of our results have direct implications at the strategic level, many of them have
consequences in the details. For example, Dewmocracy was designed as an elaborate process where
several groups of consumers formed “flavor nations” and ran serious campaigns for their own favorite
candidate. What the exact rules should be in this process is a complex question, but we believe
that some of our results can provide guidance in these matters. For example, whether the initial
candidates come solely from consumers or the firm should interject makes an important difference.
How committed the firm should be to the winning candidate is also important and firms can formulate
their process in a way that gives them more flexibility (e.g. implement one of the multiple winning
ideas). Furthermore, the decision as to the complexity and breadth of the process has tremendous
impact on the level and type of consumer engagement. In particular, allowing potentially negative
or only positive reactions to candidates can be influenced by the firm via the choice of platform (e.g.
there are “dislikes” on YouTube, but only “likes” on Facebook).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We need to determine the firm’s profits in three cases: i) When it
does not use market research or DPD, ii) when it uses traditional market research, iii) when it uses
DPD. We already covered the first case and derived results for piN (q) in (see (3)). When the firm uses
traditional market research, its profit is simply piM = v − t16 as there is no uncertainty and the firm
locates in the middle of the relevant interval. Finally, when the monopolist uses DPD, its profits are
EpiD = v− tE(max(Xw, 1/2−Xw))2 which does not depend on q and is between v− t4 and v− t16 (4).
It is clear from the above that piM > max(piN (q), EpiD) for any 0 < q ≤ 1/2, proving part 1. For part
2, note that piN (q) is continuous and decreasing between q = 0 and q = 1/2, from EpiN (0) = v − t/16
to EpiN (1/2) = v − t/4. Furthermore, it is easy to see that EpiD ≤ v − t/16 with an equation iff the
DPD is perfect (i.e. Xw ≡ 1/4). Thus, there exists a 0 < q < 1/2 such that EpiN (q) = EpiD which
satisfies part 2 of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1: Throughtout the proofs, we will use the solution of the standrad Hotelling
model with quadratic travel costs. D’Aspremont et al. (1979) showed that when consumers are uni-
formly distributed in [0, 1], Firm A (the firm towards the left) is located at rA = a and its competitor,
Firm B is located at rB = 1− b then a unique pricing equilibrium exists and profits are
ΠA(t, a, b) =
t(1− a− b)(3 + a− b)2
18
, ΠB(t, a, b) =
t(1− a− b)(3 + b− a)2
18
,
given that a+b ≤ 1 (a or b can be negative). We will use these results, but we mostly need to translate
them to the settings where consumers are distributed uniformly in [0, 1/2] or [1/2, 1]. Therefore, we
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define
ΠLA(t, α, β) = ΠA(t/4, 2α, 2β − 1), ΠLB(t, α, β) = ΠA(t/4, 2β − 1, 2α), and
ΠRA(t, α, β) = ΠA(t/4, 2α− 1, 2β), ΠRB(t, α, β) = ΠA(t/4, 2β, 2α− 1),
for the cases of left- and right-sided demand respectively where α and β measure the distance from
the endpoints of the [0, 1] interval (they can be negative, but α + β ≤ 1). When neither firm uses
DPD, they both face uncertainty about the demand. The expected profit of the firm on the left
will be EpiA = qΠ
L
A(t, α, β) + (1 − q)ΠRA(t, α, β). Plugging in the relevant formulas we get EpiA =
t(1−α−β)(q(2+α−β)2+(1−q)(1+α−β)2
9 . Fixing β, this function is concave in α and has a unique maximum
as long as −1/2 ≤ α ≥ 1 − β. Differentiating and setting to 0, yields the best response of α∗(β) =
β−2q−1+
√
4(β−q−1)2−4β−3q
3 . Deriving the other firm’s best response in a similar fashion we obtain the
unique equilibrium with the locations that are stated in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2: To determine Firm 2’s best response, we have to determine its expected
profit given that Firm 1’s location is random. We can write these as integrals, using the functions
defined above. When β < 0, that is, when Firm 2 is located to the right of the [0, 1] interval Firm 2 is
always on the left of Firm 1, but we have to integrate over the cases of left- and right sided demand
to obtain
Epi2 =
∫ 1/2
0
ΠLB(t, x, β)f(x)dx+
∫ 1
1/2
ΠRB(t, x, β)f(x)dx. (9)
When 0 < β, we have to separate the integrals because Firm 2 might be on the left or the right of
Firm 1. To simplify notation, let us introduce Firm 2’s general profit function
G2(t, α, β) =

ΠRB(t, α, β) if β ≤ 1− α and α > 1/2
ΠLB(t, α, β) if β ≤ 1− α and α ≤ 1/2
ΠRA(t, 1− β, 1− α) if β > 1− α and α > 1/2
ΠLA(t, 1− β, 1− α) if β > 1− α and α ≤ 1/2
when Firm 1 is located at α and Firm 2 is located at 1− β. With this, Firm 2’s expected profit can
be written as
Epi2 =
∫ 1
0
G2(t, x, β)f(x)dx = q
∫ 1/4
0
H2(t, x, β)fw(x)dx+ (1− q)
∫ 1/4
0
H2(t, x, 1− β)fw(x)dx,
where H2(t, α, β) = G2(t, α, β)+G2(t, 1/2−α, β), since fw() is symmetric around 1/4 and G2(t, α, β) =
G2(t, 1 − α, 1 − β). Analyzing the H2(t, x, β) function for 0 < x < 1/4, one can see that it has three
possible local maxima at 0 < β∗1 < 1/2, β∗2 = 3/4, and 1 < β∗3 < 3/2. The function is increasing for
β < β∗1 and decreasing for β > β∗3 . The global maximum is at β∗2 iff x < x∗ ≈ 0.041, otherwise it is at
both β∗1 and β∗3 . One can determine the maxima of H2(t, x, 1− β) in a similar way and conclude that
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the global maximum of H2(t, x, β) + H2(t, x, 1 − β) is at 1 − β∗3 < 0 as long as x is close enough to
1/4. Therefore, if the fw() distribution is close to 1/4 with a high enough probability the maximum
of the integral will be reached for a negative β.
Therefore, we have shown that when fw’s variance is low, Firm 2’s optimal choice of β must be
negative. We differentiate (9) with respect to β and obtain
∂Epi2
∂β
=
∫ 1/2
0
∂ΠLB(t, x, β)
∂β
f(x)dx+
∫ 1
1/2
∂ΠRB(t, x, β)
∂β
f(x)dx =
t
9
(
q
∫ 1/2
0
[1− 2β − 2x
−3β2 + 2xβ + x2]fw(x)dx+ (1− q)
∫ 1
1/2
[−6β − 2x− 3β2 + 2xβ + x2]fw(x− 1/2)dx
)
It is straightforward to express this as a linear combination of the first two moments of fw(.) as parts
in the square brackets are quadratic in x. Completing the calculation results in the first order con-
dition t9
(∫ 1/2
0 [(7q − 3)/4− β(3β − 3q + 1)]fw(x)dx +
∫ 1/2
0 [2β − 1− q]xfw(x)dx +
∫ 1/2
0 x
2fw(x)dx
)
= t9
(
(7q − 3)/4− β(3β − 3q + 1) + 2β−1−q4 + 1/16 + σf
)
= 0, since the expectation of the distri-
bution fw(.) is 1/4. Solving this in β and checking the second order condition reveals Firm 2’s best
response as β∗ = −34 +
q+
√
q2−q+1+
4σ2
f
3
2 < 0, which translates to the location stated in the lemma
r2(q) = 1−β∗. Note that the location only depends on the first two moments of fw(.) and its standard
deviation has a very small effect. Since fw(.) is symmetric around 1/4 and its support is [0, 1/2], the
range of σ2f is limited to 0 ≤ σ2f ≤ 1/16, thus barely affecting the expression under the square root.
For further reference, we calculate the exact expression when Firm 1 uses a PL(2) process. In this
case, the location of Firm 2 and the payoffs will be r2(q) =
7
4 −
q+
√
q2−q+73/72
2 ,
piND2 (q) =
t
36
(
S3 + q3 − 3
2
q2 +
q
2
+
13
12
)
, piDN1 (q) = pi
ND
2 (q) +
t
36
(
179
6
− 24S
)
,
where S =
√
q2 − q + 73/72.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let piNN (q) denote the equilibrium profits in the case when firms do
not engage in DPD as determined in Lemma 1. Similraly, let piND < piDN denote profits when only
one firm uses DPD (as given by Lemma 2). Furhtermore, we need to determine the profits obtained in
six more subgames. First, let piMN denote profits when Firm 1 uses traditional market research, and
Firm 2 does not use any market research. We can determine the equilibrium in the same way as we
proved Lemma 1, revealing that there are two possible equilibria depending on which side each firm
decides to be closer to:
r2(q)
∗ =
27− 8q −R
16
, rL1 (q)
∗ =
r2(q)
∗ − 1
3
, rR1 (q)
∗ =
r2(q)
∗
3
,
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r2(q)
∗∗ =
−3− 8q +R
16
, rL1 (q)
∗∗ =
2 + r2(q)
∗∗
3
, rR1 (q)
∗∗ =
3 + r2(q)
∗∗
3
,
where R =
√
64q2 − 64q + 81. Profits in the two equilibria are piMN (q)∗ = −4q/243 + 4q2/81 −
qR/243− 8q3/243 + q2R/243− 7R/96 + 27/32, piNM (q)∗ = −4q/243 + 4q2/81− qR/243− 8q3/243 +
q2R/243+R/96+3/32, piMN (q)∗∗ = 4q/243−4q2/81−qR/243+8q3/243+q2R/243−7R/96+27/32,
piNM (q)∗∗ = 4q/243− 4q2/81− qR/243 + 8q3/243 + q2R/243 +R/96 + 3/32. The difference between
profits in the two equilibria are very small, and satisfy piMN (q)∗ > piNN , piMN (q)∗∗ > piNN . Therefore,
the best response to N cannot be N .
Second, when both firms decide to use traditional market research, we simply end up with the
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) model in [0, 1/2] or [1/2, 1] with equilibrium profits of piMM = piNN (0) = 3t16 .
Examining the profit levels reveals that piMM > piMN (q)∗ and piMM > piMN (q)∗∗, therefore the best
response to M cannot be N either.
Third, to determine piMD and piDM , the case when one firm uses traditional market research and
its competitor uses DPD we can simply apply Lemma 2 at q = 0. Since market research gives perfect
information about demand, the case when one firm uses market research and its competitor applies
DPD is equivalent to the case in which one firm does not use any market research, its competitor uses
DPD, but there is no uncertainty. Therefore piMD = piND(0) and piDM = piDN (0).
Finally, let
piDD =
∫ 1/2
0
(∫ x
0
ΠLA(t, 1− y, 1− x)fw(y)dy +
∫ 1/2
x
ΠLB(t, x, y)fw(y)dy
)
fw(x)dx
denote profits when both firms use DPD.
In order to determine the equilibrium choice of market research and DPD, we first show that
piDN (q) > piNN (q). Comparing the formulas obtained in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 confirms
this when a PL(2) process is used. Furthermore, making the same calculation for the perfect DPD
process (σf = 0) reveals that the same holds. Since profits change continuously as σf increases,
we can conclude that the inequality holds when σf is smaller than a positive threshold σ
′. Nu-
merical calculations suggest that this threshold is the same as σ in Lemma 2. For example, a
PL(2) process results in r2(0) =
7−
√
73/18
4 ≈ 1.247 when the demand is certainly left-sided and
r2(1/2) =
6−
√
55/18
4 ≈ 1.063 when a left- or right-sided demand is equally likely. Corresponding
firm payoffs are piDN1 (0) =
t
3110426712− 1655
√
146 ≈ 0.215t, piND2 (0) = t31104936 + 73
√
146 ≈ 0.058t,
piDN1 (1/2) =
t
3110426712− 1673
√
110 ≈ 0.295t, piND2 (1/2) = t31104936 + 55
√
110 ≈ 0.049t.
We can conclude that N cannot be a best response to D, which, combined with our previous
analysis, yields that D is a dominated strategy. We can thus focus on M as D as possible equilibrium
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strategies.
Note that piMD > piDD certainly holds as long as σf < σ (from Lemma 2): we have already
determined what a firm’s best response location is when it uses market research and its competitor uses
DPD. The unique best response results in a profit of piMD. If Firm 1 were to use DPD as a response,
which is essentially a mixed strategy, it would result in piDD which has to be less than the best response
profit of piMD. In addition, it follows from piDN (q) > piNN (q) that piDM = piDN (0) > piNN (0) = piMM .
In sum, we have shown that N cannot be played in equilibrium, piDM > piMM and piMD > piDD.
Therefore, the equilibrium in pure strategies must be assymetric with one firm using market research
and its competitor engaging in DPD. Furthermore, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies where firms use DPD with probability 0 < P = pi
DM−piMM
piDM−piMM+piMD−piDD < 1 and use market
research with probability 1− P .
Proof of Proposition 3: It is enough to show the above structure of equilibria for σf = 0 as the
results change continuously and hold for small values of σf as long as the p.d.f is differentiable. Hence,
we assume that if a firm uses DPD the outcome will be 1/4 or 3/4, depending on whether demand is
left- or right-sided. The option of not using either DPD or market research is dominated, hence we
only examine the choice between the latter two. We first examine the subgame in which both firms
use DPD, assuming that demand is left-sided. That is, for firm i the deviation is |ri − 1/4|. Denoting
the firm on the left as Firm 1, and using the notation κ = r1 ≤ λ = 1/2 − r2, we can determine the
location of the indifferent consumer as
xˆ =
p2 − p1 + t/4− t(λ2 − λ− κ2 + g(κ− λ))
t(1− 2κ− 2λ)
when she is closer to 1/4 than to each firm. As we will show this will always be the case in the pricing
equilibrium and price changes that take the location closer to each firm’s location are not profitable.
Writing the first order conditions for the profit functions yields p∗1 =
t
4 +
t(λ2−κ2−κ−2λ+g(κ−λ))
3 and
p∗2 =
t
4 +
t(κ2−λ2−λ−2κ+g(λ−κ))
3 . Checking with the above prices confirm the required location of the
indifferent consumer. Plugging into the profit functions, we obtain
Π1(κ, λ, t) =
t[4κ2 − 4λ2 + 4κ+ 8λ− 3 + 4g(λ− κ)]2
72(1− 2κ− 2λ) ,
Π2(κ, λ, t) =
t[4λ2 − 4κ2 + 4λ+ 8κ− 3 + 4g(κ− λ)]2
72(1− 2κ− 2λ) .
Differentiating with respect to locations yields the equilibrium of κ∗ = λ∗ = 4g−18 if g < 3/4. For
g = 0 this formula replicates our previous results for both firms using market research. As g reaches
3/4, firms will not find it profitable to deviate at all and will stick with the DPD outcome.
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To examine the case when one firm (say Firm 1) uses market research, whereas its competitor uses
DPD with possible deviations, we determine the location of the indifferent consumer in the relevant
region as
xˆ =
p2 − p1 + t/4− t(λ2 − λ− κ2 + g(1/4− λ))
t(1− 2κ− 2λ)
Following the same steps as above, we obtain the equilibrium locations of
κ∗ =
4g − 4g2 − 3
8(3− 4g) , λ
∗ =
16g − 12g2 − 3
8(3− 4g)
for g < 1/2 and κ∗ = −1/4, λ∗ = 1/4 for g ≥ 1/2. Again, for g → 0, this replicates the case of both
firms using market research and above the g = 1 threshold, the firm using DPD will not deviate from
the DPD outcome.
Combining the different cases, yields the profit firms make in the four cases as functions of g.
Comparing piMM (g), piDM (g), piMD(g), piDD(g) reveals the following patterns. As discussed, all func-
tions start at the same point piMM (0) = piDM (0) = piMD(0) = piDD(0) = 3t/16 and piMM (g) =
piMM (0) = piMM is constant. For low values of g, when 0 < g < gA ≈ 0.420, we have piMM (g) >
piDM (g) > piMD(g) > piDD(g), leading to an equilibrium where both firms use market research.
For gA ≤ g < gB ≈ 0.470, we obtain piDM (g) > piMM (g) > piMD(g) > piDD(g), that is, we
have the assymetric equilibrium with one firm using DPD, the other using market research. For,
gB ≤ g < gC = 19/36 ≈ 0.5277, this changes to piDM (g) > piMM (g) > piDD(g) > piMD(g), leading to a
prisoners dilemma with both firms using DPD. Finally, for gC ≤ g, we again get the familiar pattern
of piDM (g) > piMM (g) > piMD(g) > piDD(g), leading to the asymmetric equilibrium, just as in the
basic model.
Proof of Corollary 1: For part 1, recall that when both firms have 0 < g < gA then both of
them use market research in equilibrium. This does not change if only one of them has a positive g as
using DPD leads to lower profits than using market research (as per Proposition 3). Therefore, there
are a multitude of equilibria, but the final locations are the same as if both firms used traditional
market research. They might self-commit with a high g, but this is not relevant as then they choose
not use DPD.
For part 2, we saw in Proposition 3 that using DPD is a best response to both market research
and DPD. The same argument holds in the g-choice stage, where the best response to either 0 or g is
g. Since both firms choose g1 = g2 = g, they will both use DPD according to Proposition 3.
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Finally, for part 3, the best response is to do the opposite as one’s competitor does in DPD stage.
A firm anticipating doing market research anyway will be indifferent between the two choices of g,
leading to multiple equilibria. That is, either both firms set g1 = g2 = g and then only one uses DPD,
or only one firm sets gi = g and then that firm uses DPD, whereas its competitor with gj = 0 will be
indifferent between market research and DPD.
Proof of Lemma 3: When 1/4 ≤ rL+rR2 ≤ 3/4 pre-selecting x1 = rL and x2 = rR suffices. When
rL+rR
2 < 1/4, the firm should pre-select the following candidates x1 = r
L, x2 = ... = xk = r
R, where
k =
⌈
1−rL−rR
rL+rR
⌉
. The case of r
L+rR
2 > 3/4 is similar.
Proof of Corollary 2: The market research-equivalent locations are either
rLi = −1/8, rLj = 5/8, rRi = 3/8, rRj = 9/8
which can be achieved using the candidates x1 = −1/8, x2 = x3 = x4 = 3/8 for Firm i and y1 = y2 =
y3 = 5/8, y4 = 9/8 for Firm j. Clearly, three or fewer candidates are not enough. For Firm i, two
candidates have to be −1/8 and 3/8 and no matter where the third candidate is 3/8 will get more
votes than −1/8 when demand is left-sided.
Proof of Corollary 3: In order for an rL, rR pair to be attainable by a PREPL(2), it is trivial
that 1/4 ≤ rL+rR2 ≤ 3/4 is a sufficient and necessary condition. Adding this restriction on strategies
to the proof of Proposition 2 leads to the stated results.
Proof of Proposition 4: It is clear that any subgame in which firms do not use DPD is not
affected by vd. Also, as in any Hotelling-type model, equilibrium profits do not change if valuations
for both firms’ products are increased by the same amount, therefore piDD(vd) = pi
DD for any vd > 0.
Nonetheless, the asymmetric subgames are affected and we expect that piDM (vd) will be increasing,
whereas piMD(vd) is decreasing. However, we do not need to show this strong of a result. For our
proposition it is enough to show that piMD(vd) can be arbitrarily close to 0, and pi
DM (vd) is higher
than piDM (0) > piMM (0) at the same time. This is quite easy to see, since when vd > t the firm that
uses DPD will get all the demand if its sets a price of vd. The equilibrium demand of that firm will then
be at least vdvd+v , whereas its competitor gets
v
vd+v
. The latter goes to 0, whereas the former goes to 1
as vd →∞. Therefore, with a high enough vd, we have piMD(vd) < piDD(vd) < piMM (vd) < piDM (vd),
akin to the prisoner’s dilemma. We can show the exact same pattern for piDN (vd), pi
ND(vd), completing
the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 4: A simple comparison of the profits in the mixed strategy equilibrium
determined in the proof of Proposition 2 and the subgame when both firms use a PL(2) DPD process
confirms this result.
Proof of Lemma 4: Assuming a left-sided demand and a product location of Xw = r ≤ 1/4,
there are two possibilities. With 1/2 probability, the consumer at location 0 voted for the winner and
the consumer at 1/2 did not, whereas with 1/2 probability the opposite happened. In the former case,
the firm will set a price of vb + vd −max(tr2 + vn, t(1/2− r)2) and in the latter case it will set a price
of v + vd − t(1/2 − r)2. Expected profits conditional on r will be vb + vd − t(1/2 − r)2 if r ≤ 14 − vnt
and v+ vd+ tr− tr2− 1+vn2 otherwise. Integrating over the possible locations of r we get the expected
profits conditional on r ≤ 1/4 which is equal to the total expected profits as the distribution and
profits are symmetric around 1/4.
EΠd = vb + vd − t
∫ 1
4
r=0
32r(1/2− r)2dr +
∫ 1/4
r= 1
4
− vn
t
16r (vn + tr − t/4) dr,
leading to the formula provided in the lemma
Proof of Proposition 5: We expect this result to hold for larger values of vn as well, but we
focus on the case when vn is small to keep the analysis simple and by ensuring that the solutions of
the pricing subgames remain interior. Since both firms use DPD, their locations are given by random
variables, as the outcome of the PL(2) DPD process: r1 and r2. Assuming a left-sided demand, let
us fix the values of r1 = x and r2 = y. As we discussed before Lemma 4, the set of consumers who
did not vote for the product at ri are to the left or the right with 1/2 probability each. Let rˆ denote
the location of the indifferent consumer when vn = 0. There are four possibilities with regards to
whether the consumers around rˆ voted for the winning products or not. They either voted for both
firms’ winning proudcts, neither of them, or for only one of them (either 1 or 2). In the first two cases
the equilibrium does not change when vd increases from 0 as valuations for the two products either do
not change or both change with the same amount. The latter two assymetric events happen with the
same probabilities, therefore the expected profit of Firm i conditional on this outcome will be equal
to the average of Firm i’s profits in equilibrum in these two cases. One can determine that Firm 1’s
profits are pi+1 =
t
9
(x2−y2+x−y−vn/t)2
y−x , and pi
−
1 =
t
9
(x2−y2+x−y+vn/t)2
y−x in the cases when Firm 1 has a
valuation advantage (disadvantage) of vn. It is clear that
pi+1 +pi
−
1
2 is increasing in vn (and so is
pi+2 +pi
−
2
2 ).
Therefore, the conditional expected profits are increasing in vn and it is clear that the probability of
such an outcome is positive.
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